

*E*valuation



*R*eport

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PHASE II

Report Number 98-156

June 16, 1998

Office of the Inspector General
Department of Defense

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Acronyms

AFSC	Armed Forces Staff College
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
FYDP	Future Years Defense Plan
IG	Inspector General
JDAL	Joint Duty Assignment List
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JSO	Joint Specialty Officer
TDY	Temporary Duty



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

June 16, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Evaluation Report on Joint Professional Military Education Phase II
(Report No. 98-156)

We are providing this evaluation report for review and comment. We considered management comments on a draft of this report in preparing the final report. Finding paragraphs A and B were revised based on comments from the Joint Staff.

The Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps comments on the draft report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3, and left no unresolved issues. Therefore, no additional comments are required from the Services. Based on comments from the Air Force, we deleted the Air Force from Recommendation A.1.c.

The Joint Staff did not provide the anticipated completion date of the study planned in response to Recommendation B.1., nor a concurrence or nonconcurrence with the potential monetary benefits. We request the Director, Joint Staff provide additional comments in response to this final report by August 17, 1998.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the evaluation staff. Questions on the evaluation should be directed to Ms. Judith Heck, at (703) 604-9575 (DSN 664-9575), e-mail address jheck@dodig.osd.mil. See Appendix E for the report distribution. The evaluation team members are listed inside the back cover.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Robert J. Lieberman", is positioned above the typed name.

Robert J. Lieberman
Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing

Joint Professional Military Education Phase II

Executive Summary

Introduction. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act) requires DoD to establish joint billets and develop a program of joint education. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is that portion of professional military education which concentrates on the instruction of joint matters. JPME consists of a two-phase military educational requirement. Phase I is incorporated into the curriculum taught to officers at Service-operated staff colleges. The Phase II program deals with integrated strategic deployment, employment, and sustainment of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces with an emphasis on joint planning. The primary institution tasked with teaching JPME Phase II is the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC). The Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College also provide both JPME Phase I and Phase II for senior-level officers. The Goldwater-Nichols Act also requires DoD to periodically review and revise the curriculum of each JPME school to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters. Subsequent legislation mandates that the primary course at the AFSC be at least 3 months long. Of 9,317 joint billets identified in 1997, the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that half (4,659 billets) must be filled by joint specialty officers or nominees.

Evaluation Objectives. The evaluation objective was to determine whether the JPME Phase II program was meeting the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. We assessed the Services' processes for assignment of officers to JPME Phase II and their management of joint officer assignments. In addition, we evaluated the role of the AFSC in the education of joint officers and the development of joint specialty officers. We did not, however, review or analyze the content of the JPME Phase II curriculum. We reviewed management controls relative to the evaluation objectives.

Evaluation Results. DoD established a joint educational program and joint officer management policies as required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. However, in November 1997, there was a shortfall of 189 JPME Phase II graduates in joint billets. This shortfall limited the number of JPME Phase II-trained officers required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Finding A).

The length of the JPME Phase II 12-week course at the AFSC needs to be reevaluated while maintaining the quality of the education. The length of the course is mandated by Title 10, United States Code, Section 663 (10 U.S.C. 663). Reducing the length of the course and adding another course at the AFSC could result in an increased throughput of approximately 200 or more students annually (Finding B).

Lower per diem costs could be realized if the JPME Phase II course length is reduced. See Part I for a discussion of the evaluation results and Appendix D for a summary of potential benefits.

Management Controls. The management controls we reviewed were effective in that we found no material weaknesses. See Appendix A for details on the management control program.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommend that Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel managers maximize the practice of sending officers to the AFSC en route to joint billets. We also recommend that the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, schedule officers, who attend the AFSC after reporting to their joint billets, as early as possible within the first year of their joint assignments. Further, we recommend that the Navy and the Marine Corps aggressively use alternate student lists for JPME Phase II to take advantage of any seats vacated. We recommend that the Navy send more officers to joint assignments after they attend the AFSC. We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, designate a single point of contact to coordinate last minute JPME Phase II course substitutions. We also recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, examine the JPME Phase II course and determine how much it can be shortened while still maintaining the quality of joint education and achieving the desired benefits of multi-Service acculturation. Further, we recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, confirm combatant commanders' support for a shortened JPME Phase II course at the next commanders' conference and determine what change to 10 U.S.C. 663 is deemed necessary.

Management Comments. The Navy stated that it established a priority assignment policy, giving AFSC seats to officers en route to or within the first year of their joint assignments. It will aggressively pursue sending officers to JPME Phase II within the first year of their joint assignments, and will make every effort to detail AFSC graduates to joint activities. The Air Force stated that it improved its number of joint officers attending en route to the AFSC and will continue to maximize this practice. Further, the Air Force is sending 81 percent of its officers to the school within the first year of their joint assignments, and will continue to make that a priority. The Marine Corps stated that it will fill as many quotas as possible with officers en route to their joint assignments. It is, however, limited by organizations who are unwilling to accept a 3-month gap in a position. Further, the Marine Corps will make every effort to schedule officers for the AFSC within the first year of their joint tours and will continue to aggressively use standby lists. The Joint Staff stated that it designated a single point of contact (J-7) to coordinate substitutions at the school. Further, it is reviewing all JPME objectives, course length, faculty, and instructive modes, and will coordinate recommendations with the combatant commanders. We received unsolicited comments from the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific Command. Both commands agreed with sending officers to the AFSC en route to joint billets and supported a reduction in course length. See Part I for a discussion of the comments and Part III for the full text of the comments.

Evaluation Response. The Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps comments on the draft report were responsive. However, we request that the Director, Joint Staff provide the anticipated completion date of the study planned in response to the recommendation to shorten courses and a concurrence or nonconcurrence with potential monetary benefits by August 17, 1998.

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Part I - Evaluation Results

Evaluation Background

Introduction. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is that portion of professional military education which concentrates on the instruction of joint matters. It is geared toward providing officers with a broad base of joint professional knowledge and developing officers with experience and education to improve strategic and operational capabilities of joint forces. JPME consists of a two-phase military educational requirement. Phase I is incorporated into the curriculum taught to officers at Service-operated staff colleges. Phase II is the follow-on portion of that educational process and complements Phase I. The Phase II program deals with integrated strategic deployment, employment, and sustainment of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces with an emphasis on joint planning. The main provider of Phase II education is the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia. Both phases of JPME are available for senior-level military personnel at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College, both located at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. The three colleges have the capacity of graduating an average of 1,200 officers with JPME Phase II education each year.

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols Act). The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires DoD to establish joint billets and to develop a program of joint education. It tasks the Secretary of Defense, with advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), to enhance the education and training of certain officers in joint matters and to periodically review and revise joint curriculum.

Professional Military Education Panel. In 1987, Congress established a working group, the Professional Military Education Panel (the Skelton Panel), chaired by Congressman Ike Skelton of Missouri, to determine how DoD was implementing the JPME requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Skelton Panel issued a report in April 1989 recommending a two-phase approach to JPME, with Phase I accomplished at the intermediate Service colleges and Phase II at the AFSC. The panel also recommended that the Phase II course be 3 months in length. Before April 1989, the AFSC was teaching the 6-month Joint Combined Staff Officer School primarily for lieutenant commanders and majors, graduating two classes each year. In 1990, the AFSC adjusted its program to comply with congressional requirements for JPME. The AFSC revised its curriculum by replacing the 6-month course with a two-level curriculum (intermediate and senior) to provide Phase II joint education. Intermediate-level officers completed a 9-week curriculum while senior officers were in a 5-week JPME Phase II curriculum. In 1991, the intermediate course was expanded to 12 weeks. In 1994, the senior course was also expanded to 12 weeks.

Joint Policy Guidance. The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires DoD to establish joint officer management policies. DoD Directive 1300.19, "DoD Joint Officer Management Program," September 9, 1997, and DoD Instruction 1300.20, "DoD Joint Officer Management Program Procedures," December 20, 1996,

provide the required guidance, assigning overall responsibility for the monitoring of the Joint Officer Management Program to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy). Additionally, the CJCS has specific responsibility for implementing Office of the Secretary of Defense policies regarding the Joint Officer Management Program and for formulating policies for training and educating Armed Forces personnel. The CJCS issued an implementing instruction, CJCS Instruction 1800.01, "Officer Professional Military Education Policy," March 1, 1996, which promulgates policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for professional military education of officers.

Joint Staff. Although the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) has overall responsibility for the management of the Joint Officer Management Program, the Joint Staff is tasked with implementing the program. Two Joint Staff directorates, the Director for Manpower and Personnel (J-1) and the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), play important roles in the Joint Officer Management Program. The J-1 maintains the database for joint personnel and coordinates with the Services on selection of personnel to become joint specialty officers (JSOs). The J-7 has overall responsibility for oversight and accreditation of the military college system.

National Defense University. The parent organization of the colleges providing JPME Phase II is the National Defense University, located at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Three National Defense University colleges provide JPME Phase II to military officers: the AFSC, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the National War College. The AFSC offers two JPME Phase II courses, both 12 weeks long: an intermediate course for junior-level commanders, lieutenant commanders, junior-level lieutenant colonels, and majors; and a senior course for colonels, captains, senior-level lieutenant colonels, and senior-level commanders. The intermediate course is offered four times each year and graduates an average of 200 students per class. The senior course is offered three times each year and graduates an average of 30 students per class. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College provide a 10-month curriculum for senior-level officers and graduate approximately 300 students per year; their graduates are certified as having met the requirements of both JPME Phase I and Phase II.

Role of the Services. Personnel centers for the Services play the central role in assigning officers to joint billets and in selecting officers for JPME Phase II. Each Service has a separate, dedicated branch to oversee joint officer matters. The Services are responsible for selecting personnel to attend JPME Phase II and for assigning personnel to follow-on joint duty. The Services are responsible for managing assignments to ensure the DoD is in compliance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act requirements by maximizing the temporary duty (TDY) assignment of personnel to the AFSC when they are en route to their joint assignment (TDY en route) so that key jobs at joint organizations are not left vacant. In accordance with CJCS Instruction 1800.01, an officer who cannot attend TDY en route, due to the limited capacity of the AFSC, should be sent TDY to attend the course within the first year of the joint tour and then returned to duty (TDY and return). Given these constraints, Joint Staff procedures encourage each Service component responsible for assigning

personnel to JPME Phase II to maintain a standby list to fill those seats that might otherwise go vacant. See Appendix C for a description of Service selection and coordination procedures for JPME Phase II.

Joint Duty Assignment List. The Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is a consolidated list of joint duty assignment billets approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy). Billets on the JDAL are those positions in a multi-Service activity that involve the employment or support of the air, land, or sea forces of at least two of the three Military Departments. Throughout 1997, the JDAL fluctuated between 9,172 and 9,359 joint billets.

Joint Specialty Officers. The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires DoD to fill 50 percent of JDAL billets with JSOs or JSO nominees. Officers eligible to be designated JSOs have completed both phases of JPME and have served a full tour in a billet on the JDAL. The Military Departments review the records of officers who meet the criteria and recommend officers to the Secretary of Defense for final designation as JSOs. Officers serving in joint billets who have completed both phases of JPME are considered JSO nominees. Additionally, officers serving in up to 12 1/2 percent of JDAL billets who possess a critical occupational specialty are also considered JSO nominees, regardless of whether or not they have completed JPME Phase II. Each Service has the responsibility of ensuring that 50 percent of JDAL billets are filled with JSOs or nominees.

Evaluation Objectives

The evaluation objective was to determine whether the JPME Phase II program was meeting the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. We assessed the Services' processes for assignment of officers to JPME Phase II and their management of joint officer assignments. In addition, we evaluated the role of the AFSC in the education of joint officers and the development of JSOs. Finally, we reviewed management controls relative to the evaluation objectives. Appendix A describes the evaluation scope and methodology and the results of the review of management controls. Appendix B summarizes prior coverage related to the evaluation objective. Appendix C provides additional background information pertaining to the evaluation.

Finding A. Shortage of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Graduates

In November 1997, there was a shortfall of 189 JPME Phase II graduates in joint billets. Factors contributing to this shortfall were the timing of attendance, the assignment of Navy graduates to other than joint billets, the empty seats caused by late withdrawals, and the throughput at the Armed Forces Staff College due to its limited capacity. This shortfall limited the number of JPME Phase II-trained officers required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act

DoD was meeting the Goldwater-Nichols Act requirement to establish policies, procedures, and practices for officers oriented and trained toward joint matters. However, not enough officers assigned to joint billets were being sent to JPME Phase II prior to or during a joint assignment. The Goldwater-Nichols Act requirement that 50 percent of JDAL billets must be filled by JSOs or nominees was not being met.

Capacity of the JPME Phase II Institutions

The AFSC provides the largest number of JPME Phase II graduates. The annual capacity of its intermediate program is 810 students, and the annual capacity of its senior program is 90 students. If filled to maximum capacity, and with a 100 percent completion rate, the AFSC could graduate 900 students each year. Annually, the capacity of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College is approximately 300. The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that more than 50 percent of the graduates of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College be sent to joint billets following graduation. Combined, the three colleges can graduate enough JPME Phase II graduates to fill half of all JDAL billets.

Number of JPME Phase II Graduates. There was a shortfall of officers in joint billets who were JPME Phase II graduates. In November 1997, the JDAL consisted of 9,317 joint billets. The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that 4,659 of those billets be filled by JSOs or nominees. As of November 1997, only 4,470 joint billets were filled by JSOs or nominees; 189 billets DoD-wide that required JPME Phase II graduates were not appropriately filled. During the year 1997, the number of JDAL billets fluctuated from 9,172 to 9,359. When the JDAL had 9,172 billets, the shortfall was 88. The Army was the only Service that consistently met the Goldwater-Nichols Act requirements for

Finding A. Shortage of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Graduates

filling 50 percent of its joint billets with JSOs or nominees. The Air Force generally met the requirements for filling 50 percent of its joint billets with JSOs or nominees in 1997.

Shortfall Factors

We attributed the shortfall of JPME Phase II graduates to four factors: the timing of attendance; the assignment of Navy graduates to other than joint billets; the empty seats caused by late withdrawals; and the throughput at the AFSC due to its limited capacity.

Timing of Attendance. To take full advantage of their joint education and to ensure compliance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, officers being sent to joint billets should attend JPME Phase II as early as possible. The CJCS Instruction 1800.01 states that, optimally, officers should complete their joint education prior to or within the first year of their joint assignments. However, limited course availability at the AFSC and Service assignment priorities precluded most officers assigned to joint billets from going to the JPME Phase II course TDY en route. Officers who attend the AFSC TDY en route subsequently count as JPME Phase II graduates for the entire 36-month joint tour. In academic year 1996, 264 officers (30 percent) who completed JPME Phase II at the AFSC were TDY en route. In academic year 1997, 280 (33 percent) were TDY en route.

For officers attending the AFSC in a TDY and return status, the sooner they attend, the longer they will count as a JSO nominee in a joint billet. In academic year 1996, only 345 officers attending in a TDY and return status completed JPME Phase II within the first year of their joint assignment; 231 attended after their first year. In academic year 1997, only 272 TDY and return officers completed JPME Phase II within their first year; 241 attended after their first year. Services and joint activities are required to schedule and release joint officers for course attendance as early in their joint tours as possible within the first year. The purpose is to maximize the use of education in joint assignments and to facilitate Service compliance with statutory requirements. However, Service personnel managers reported they had minimal influence over the release of officers by the combatant commands or other joint agencies. Although the Services are responsible for joint officer education, their control is limited if the organization to which the officer is assigned holds the authority to release the officer to attend the AFSC JPME Phase II course.

Assignment to Joint Billets. Assigning AFSC graduates to non-joint billets contributed to the shortage of JPME Phase II graduates filling JDAL billets. In academic year 1996, the Navy sent 40 (19 percent) of its JPME Phase II graduates to non-joint billets. In academic year 1997, the Navy sent 34 (18 percent) of its graduates to non-joint billets.

Late Withdrawals. Late withdrawals of officers from the JPME Phase II attendance list at the AFSC resulted in unfilled course seats. Late withdrawals

Finding A. Shortage of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Graduates

were made by the joint activities to which officers were assigned. Efforts had recently been concentrated on achieving 100 percent capacity at the AFSC; however, only 241 of the 246 seats were filled in the September 1997 JPME Phase II course. Three of the four Services did not meet their quotas for filling seats. Organizations to which the officers were assigned withdrew a total of 28 officers less than 45 days prior to the course start date. Operational necessity and mission requirements were the key reasons cited by the organizations making the withdrawals. Substitutions were made for the majority of the 28 withdrawals. The Air Force made the most aggressive and effective use of its standby list, as evidenced by the Air Force filling 100 percent of its quota for academic year 1997 and filling vacant seats of other Services. Although CJCS Instruction 1800.01 authorizes the president of the National Defense University to reallocate unfilled university spaces, that level of control is not practical, and organizations involved in the scheduling process stated it was not clear which office adjudicates the question of moving unfilled billets from one Service to another.

Seats at the AFSC are highly sought after by other officers serving in joint assignments, and there is a pool of officers assigned to joint billets who have not had the opportunity to attend JPME Phase II. Every course that had vacant seats not only decreased the cost-effectiveness of the AFSC, but also contributed to the shortage of JPME Phase II graduates.

Limited Capacity. The capacity of the AFSC was a significant factor in the shortage of JPME Phase II graduates. Less than half of all officers assigned to joint billets had attended JPME Phase II. Increased throughput at the AFSC could be achieved by reducing the length of the JPME Phase II course and adding an additional course, thereby increasing the number of graduates by approximately 200 to 225 annually. Increasing throughput at the AFSC would potentially eliminate the shortage of JPME Phase II graduates. Course length is addressed separately in Finding B.

Pilot Notification Program

In 1997, the Joint Staff, in conjunction with the AFSC, established a pilot notification program to improve throughput by improving the process for coordinating course attendance. The program involves a sequence of coordination messages at specific intervals prior to course starting dates. Late changes to the attendance list are required to be fully justified and coordinated with the AFSC and the Joint Staff. A goal of this program is to maximize the number of officers who attend the course TDY en route, as opposed to attending the course TDY and return. The coordination process improved and resulted in more filled seats; however, problems still existed with the attendance since the September 1997 course had five unfilled seats. Increased coordination among the Services, combatant commands, and other organizations is expected to further improve the scheduling process and attendance.

Finding A. Shortage of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Graduates

JDAL Validation

A review and reevaluation of the JDAL by the Joint Duty Assignment List Validation Board began in June 1996. The purpose of the review is to assess the joint content of JDAL positions, to validate current positions, and to consider the appropriateness of including new positions on the JDAL. Further, the review is to ensure the JDAL is the proper size to meet the criteria and intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The review is an ongoing process instituted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, that continually modifies the JDAL. In April 1996, the number of billets on the JDAL was 9,349; at the end of 1997, the JDAL was 9,247. The number of billets on the JDAL affects the number of JPME Phase II graduates required.

Conclusion

The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that 50 percent of the billets on the JDAL be filled with officers who meet specific qualifications, including educational requirements. The AFSC and Joint Staff implemented a program to address shortfalls caused by late withdrawals. Their continued efforts to address that factor as well as efforts aimed at other factors will be vital to eliminating the shortfall of JPME Phase II graduates. Additionally, more officers should attend JPME Phase II en route to their joint assignments; officers who do not attend the course en route should be sent as early as possible within the first year of their joint tours; and graduates of JPME Phase II should subsequently be assigned to a joint billet. In order to maintain a pool of qualified officers to comply with the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, DoD must maintain a continuing flow of personnel into the joint community; ensure that they take the JPME courses required by law and DoD policies; and assign those officers to joint billets on the JDAL. Even if the JDAL validation reduces the number of joint billets, the goal of DoD should be to fill as many joint billets as feasible with JPME Phase II graduates to benefit from their educational experience.

Management Comments on Finding and Evaluation Response

Joint Staff Comments. The Joint Staff did not agree with the last sentence of the draft report finding paragraph, regarding the shortage of JPME Phase II graduates which limited the level of joint expertise. The Joint Staff stated that the current management system report indicates that JDAL positions are filled with 53 percent JSOs and JSO nominees.

Evaluation Response. After a review of the Joint Staff comments, we revised the last sentence of Finding A.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Evaluation Response

A.1. We recommend that:

a. The Chief of Naval Personnel, the Commander, Air Force Personnel Center and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps, establish the necessary controls and procedures to maximize the practice of sending officers to the Armed Forces Staff College en route to a joint billet.

Navy Comments. The Navy concurred and indicated it will review and revise, as appropriate, all policies and directives pertaining to follow-on joint duty assignments to emphasize maximum use of AFSC quotas en route to joint billets. It will complete review of the policy by September 30, 1998.

Air Force Comments. The Air Force concurred with the intent of the recommendation, stating that it is maximizing the practice of sending officers TDY en route to the AFSC, and has improved by 3 percent the overall number of officers attending en route over the last 3 years. It will continue to send officers TDY en route, but the number of officers sent TDY en route is affected by assignment reporting dates and scheduled classes, over which the Air Force has little control.

Marine Corps Comments. The Marine Corps concurred, stating that it executes its assignments to joint duty during the summer months and fills as many of those AFSC seats as possible with officers TDY en route. The Marine Corps is limited, however, by parent organizations whose requirements do not always coincide with joint training requirements, and who are unwilling to accept a 3-month gap in a position without benefit of a turnover. The Marine Corps indicated that it will continue to send officers TDY en route within the constraints that arise from the requirements of the parent organizations.

b. The Chief of Naval Personnel, the Commander, Air Force Personnel Center, and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps, schedule officers who attend the Armed Forces Staff College after reporting to their joint assignments as early as possible within the first year of those joint assignments.

Navy Comments. The Navy concurred, stating that it has established an assignment policy giving priority for AFSC seats to officers en route to or within their first year of joint activities. Further, the Navy will establish procedures by September 30, 1998, to systematically notify joint activities of officers lacking JPME Phase II.

Air Force Comments. The Air Force concurred with the intent of the recommendation, stating that it is sending 81 percent of its officers to AFSC

Finding A. Shortage of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Graduates

within the first year of their joint assignments. The Air Force continues to make that the priority after those officers who attend AFSC TDY en route to their new joint positions.

Marine Corps Comments. The Marine Corps concurred, stating that, although its intention was to send 100 percent of its officers to the AFSC JPME Phase II course within the first year of the joint duty assignment, it was not always able to do so. The joint organizations to which the officers were assigned have not always agreed to release them. The Marine Corps, however, will make every effort to schedule officers for the AFSC within the first year of their joint tours.

c. The Chief of Naval Personnel and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps, aggressively use standby lists of alternate students to fill any seats vacated.

Navy Comments. The Navy concurred, stating that it will include this recommendation in the procedures it plans to complete by September 30, 1998.

Air Force Comments. The Air Force concurred with the intent of our recommendation, stating that it already complies.

Evaluation Response. We agree with the Air Force comments, and therefore, have removed the Air Force as an addressee of this recommendation.

Marine Corps Comments. The Marine Corps concurred, stating that it has and will continue to aggressively use its standby list to ensure it fills as many of the quotas as possible. In each of the last 3 years, the Marine Corps surpassed its total allocation of officers attending the AFSC.

A.2. We recommend that the Chief of Naval Personnel take steps needed to ensure that more officers are assigned to joint billets following attendance at the Armed Forces Staff College.

Navy Comments. The Navy concurred, stating that it will review its assignment policy and make every effort to detail AFSC graduates to joint activities to the maximum extent possible. The review will be completed no later than September 30, 1998.

A.3. We recommend the Director, Joint Staff, in order to reduce late withdrawals and prevent empty seats at the Joint Professional Military Education Phase II courses at the Armed Forces Staff College, designate a single point of contact to coordinate last minute substitutions.

Joint Staff Comments. The Joint Staff neither concurred nor nonconcurred, but stated that action has been taken through a February 1998 revision to CJCS Instruction 1800.01.

Evaluation Response. The Joint Staff comments are responsive to our recommendation.

Finding B. Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Course Length

The length of the JPME Phase II 12-week course needs to be reevaluated while maintaining the quality of the education. The current course length is mandated by congressional legislation. Reduced course length and an added class would increase JPME Phase II graduates at AFSC by approximately 200 to 225 students annually.

Background

Purpose of the JPME Phase II Course. The purpose of the JPME Phase II course is to educate and provide a pool of officers trained in joint matters and to develop JSOs. The course is designed to build the joint perspective, with an emphasis on providing officers with expertise in the integrated strategic deployment, employment, and sustainment of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces. The development of a two-phase program for JPME was recommended by the Skelton Panel in 1989, as previously discussed. In 1991, Congress amended 10 U.S.C. 663 to require that the principal course of instruction at the AFSC, JPME Phase II, be no less than 3 months.

Acculturation. Another purpose of the AFSC JPME Phase II course is the acculturation of its students. For the duration of the course, students study, live, and work together. Every effort is made to intermingle students from the different Services in all aspects of the program. The seminars, living arrangements, and participation in social activities and sports are designed to facilitate understanding of the other Services' perspectives and methods of operation. This acculturation process has been in place since 1991, when the AFSC expanded the JPME Phase II intermediate course to 12 weeks.

Course Length Could Be Shortened

Joint Maturation. Students arriving for the JPME Phase II course have increased knowledge of joint warfighting methodology and multi-Service doctrine. An unquantifiable number of students have been exposed to jointness through participation in joint operations ranging from Operation Desert Storm in Southwest Asia to Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. JPME Phase I also exposes students to joint warfighting methodology and multi-Service doctrine. This "joint maturation" in JPME Phase I creates students with a much broader knowledge and a greater appreciation of the other Services' capabilities.

Combatant Command Responses. Personnel at all nine combatant commands reported the JPME Phase II program at the AFSC was too long. While they did not want to sacrifice the quality of joint education provided at the AFSC, they indicated the current 12-week JPME Phase II course could be shortened to 8

Finding B. Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Course Length

or 9 weeks, while still maintaining the same quality of joint education. Personnel at the combatant commands indicated the 12-week course length was a factor in their reluctance to release officers to attend the course. That reluctance was shared by other joint organizations, contributing to the shortage of JPME Phase II graduates. A shorter course would have less impact on organizations' missions, cause less disruption, and decrease gaps of critical personnel, especially in cases where the attendees are in positions that have only one person to do a specific job. Organizations withdrawing students from the attendance list within days of a course's starting date significantly contributed to the shortfall of JPME Phase II graduates, as discussed in Finding A.

Graduate Responses. We interviewed 58 JPME Phase II graduates of AFSC who were serving in joint billets and 31 supervisors of graduates at the combatant commands and the Joint Staff: 66 out of those 89 individuals (74 percent) indicated that the JPME Phase II course at the AFSC was too long and that the course objectives could be attained in a shorter period of time. Overall, they agreed the course was beneficial and particularly helpful in understanding how their counterparts in the other Services operated.

Operational Impact. Most officers attended the 12-week JPME Phase II course at the AFSC after they began their joint assignments (61 percent of attendees in academic year 1997). Joint assignments are normally for 36 months, so time spent at the JPME Phase II course could account for approximately 8 percent of an officer's joint tour. A shorter JPME Phase II course would take less time from an officer's joint assignment, while also allowing the AFSC to offer one additional course each year, increasing the opportunity for more officers to attend JPME Phase II. The billets many joint officers fill are operational and warfighting jobs essential to the organizations. The more time JPME Phase II graduates can spend performing the duties of their joint assignments, the higher the operational readiness of their organizations.

Course Length Could be Shortened. With operational impact in mind, and based on questionnaire responses and our interviews, we believe the need for a 12-week JPME Phase II course no longer exists and that a shorter JPME Phase II course would better serve the students and the organizations to which they are assigned. The AFSC agreed with our recommendation to capture data on the issue directly from JPME Phase II graduates and modified its graduate feedback questionnaire accordingly.

Reducing Course Length and Increasing Throughput

Reducing the course length of JPME Phase II at the AFSC would require a change in 10 U.S.C. 663, which requires the principal course of instruction at the AFSC to be no less than 3 months. A reduction in the course length from 12 weeks to 8 or 9 weeks would result in an increase in productive time; commands would be able to use their joint officers for more of their tours. Additionally, a reduction in course length would allow the AFSC to increase the

Finding B. Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Course Length

number of JPME Phase II intermediate courses from four to five per year. That could increase the annual throughput of the AFSC by approximately 200 to 225 officers, a possible 25 percent increase, thereby increasing the number of opportunities for the combatant commands and other joint organizations to educate more of their joint staffs. Another impact of the changes would be to eliminate the shortfall of JPME Phase II graduates, bringing DoD in compliance with the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Potential Economies and Efficiencies

Facing reduced resources, the DoD can realize some fiscal economies if the JPME Phase II course at the AFSC could be shortened without sacrificing the quality of education. Reducing the AFSC JPME Phase II course length would result in a reduction in the overall cost of educating each graduate. The Services would have lower per diem costs, including lodging and meal allowance for each JPME Phase II student. Reducing the course length to 8 weeks would reduce overall per diem costs by \$1,529 per person. Even adding another class of 200 to 225 officers to the AFSC schedule, DoD would still realize \$700,000 to \$775,000 in funds put to better use annually in the form of lowered per diem costs. The amount would be somewhat reduced by the additional transportation costs of \$95,000 to \$107,000 annually (approximately \$475 per person) and would result in funds put to better use in the amount of \$593,000 to \$680,000. Based on the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), that could amount from \$3.6 million to \$4.1 million for DoD over a 6-year period. The overall amount of reduced expenditures would be changed if the course were reduced to 9 weeks instead of 8 weeks. A reduction in course length to 9 weeks would result in funds put to better use in the amount of \$163,000 to \$259,000 annually considering lowered per diem costs and additional transportation costs. See Appendix D for further details.

Conclusion

Personnel at combatant commands and recent graduates of the Armed Forces Staff College indicated the JPME Phase II course of instruction at the AFSC was too long and that the benefits of the course could be achieved with the same quality results in a shorter period of time. A shorter course would reduce impact on the combatant commands and other joint organizations, and critical operational and warfighting jobs would not be gapped for as long a period of time. Some economies and efficiencies could be achieved in the cost of sending an officer to the AFSC, resulting in a reduction of per diem costs by 33 percent for each officer, if the course length were reduced to 8 weeks.

Management Comments on Finding and Evaluation Response

Joint Staff Comments. The Joint Staff did not agree with the first sentence of the finding paragraph, regarding course length. Input from the President, National Defense University and the Commandant, AFSC included in comments from the Joint Staff emphasized that our evaluation did not review or analyze the content of JPME curriculum.

Evaluation Response. After a review of the Joint Staff comments, we revised the first sentence of Finding B.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Evaluation Response

B.1. We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, examine the curriculum and determine how much the Joint Professional Military Education Phase II course can be shortened without diminishing the quality of joint education or diminishing the desired benefits of multi-Service acculturation.

Joint Staff Comments. The Joint Staff concurred, stating that its Chairman's Process for Accreditation of Joint Education Team completed a quality assessment at AFSC. A Joint Staff review is ongoing for all JPME objectives, course length, faculty and instructive modes, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Service representatives.

Evaluation Response. The Joint Staff comments were partially responsive. We request that the Director, Joint Staff provide additional comments regarding the anticipated completion date of this review, and a concurrence or nonconcurrence with potential monetary benefits.

B.2. We recommend the Director, Joint Staff, at the next combatant commanders' conference:

a. Confirm that a reduction in Joint Professional Military Education Phase II course length is supported by the combatant commanders and is in the best interests of the joint community.

b. Determine what change to Title 10, United States Code, Section 663, is deemed necessary.

Joint Staff Comments. The Joint Staff concurred, stating that it is reviewing JPME Phase II matters, including the future of JPME Phase II. The working group recommendations will be coordinated with the combatant commanders.

Finding B. Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Course Length

U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command Comments. Although not required to comment, both the U.S. Pacific Command and the U.S. Central Command supported the finding and recommendations. The U.S. Pacific Command indicated that it has made the recommendation to shorten the course three times within the last 3 years, based on feedback from graduates, and that now may be the time to fine-tune the course. The U.S. Central Command also indicated that it supports the finding and is in favor of an 8- or 9-week course. This will increase the time on-station and productivity of officers concerned, and will significantly increase the number of officers that can be trained as JSOs.

Part II - Additional Information

Appendix A. Evaluation Process

Scope and Methodology

Scope. The evaluation focused on the effectiveness of the JPME Phase II program in meeting the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, in educating joint officers, and in developing JSOs to support joint billets. We did not review or analyze the content of the JPME Phase II curriculum.

Data Gathering. We obtained and reviewed the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and related amendments, DoD policies, CJCS regulations, Service regulations, and policies and procedures regarding JPME Phase II. We reviewed documentation provided to us by the Joint Staff, the National Defense University, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the four Service personnel centers covering the period of 1995 through 1997. We provided questionnaires to selected personnel at all nine combatant commands and Service personnel centers. We interviewed DoD personnel managers, including Service personnel managers, members of the Joint Staff who have oversight of military education, and personnel at the National Defense University and the AFSC. We also interviewed 58 graduates of the AFSC and 31 graduate supervisors at three combatant commands and the Joint Staff.

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data or statistical sampling techniques for this evaluation.

Evaluation Type, Dates, and Standards. We performed this program effectiveness evaluation from June through December 1997 in accordance with standards issued and implemented by the Inspector General, DoD. Accordingly, we included those tests of management controls considered necessary.

Organizations Visited. We visited or contacted individuals and organizations within the DoD. Further details are available upon request.

Management Control Program

DoD Directive 5010.38, "Management Control (MC) Program," August 26, 1996, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of management controls that provides reasonable assurance that the programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the adequacy of the controls.

Scope of Review of the Management Control Program. We reviewed the adequacy of management control procedures for oversight of the JPME Phase II by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services. We did not review the adequacy of management's self-evaluation of those controls.

Adequacy of Management Controls. Management controls of the JPME Phase II program were adequate in that we identified no material management control weaknesses.

Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

During the last five years, the Inspector General (IG), DoD, issued a report on the joint manpower process. The General Accounting Office, in response to Congressional direction, performed a review of the progress made by DoD in the implementation of recommendations made in the DoD report. Another report, done under the auspices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, studied the potential cost savings from the possible consolidation of the Services command and staff colleges and war colleges. Additionally, the Joint Staff requested that RAND conduct an analysis of the size and composition of the JDAL.

General Accounting Office

General Accounting Office Report No. NSIAD-97-229 (OSD Case No. 1431), "Joint Manpower Process: Limited Progress Made in Implementing DoD Inspector General Recommendations," September 19, 1997, was conducted as a follow-up review to IG, DoD, Report No. 96-029, "Inspection of the Department of Defense Joint Manpower Process," November 29, 1995. The IG, DoD, inspection reported significant deficiencies in DoD joint personnel requirements and management program, and made recommendations for improvement. The General Accounting Office was requested by Congress to track the progress of implementing the recommendations made in the IG, DoD, report. The General Accounting Office reported that some action was being taken on the recommendations, including the publication of DoD Instruction 1300.20 and DoD Directive 1300.19, which provide guidance on joint personnel requirements for all joint organizations. The General Accounting Office considered that those actions satisfied the recommendations cited in the IG, DoD, report on this topic. The General Accounting Office did not make any recommendations to the DoD; therefore, no response was required. The report notes that DoD provided oral comments, which generally concurred with its findings.

Inspector General, DoD

IG, DoD, Report No. 96-029, "Inspection of the Department of Defense Joint Manpower Process," November 29, 1995. The report documents the inspection of the process used to determine, validate, approve, assign, and manage manpower at joint organizations. The inspection also assessed the ability of the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to monitor the careers of officers serving in the joint arena, with emphasis on those officers designated as JSOs. Additionally, the report covered the processes used to employ Reserve component individual

mobilization augmentees within joint organizations, to include the provision of joint training and education needed for select Reserve officers. The report identified the following systemic deficiencies.

- The processes used to determine manpower requirements for joint organizations were inadequate.
- The mechanisms used to validate and approve manpower requirements for joint organizations were inadequate.
- The Services were unable to satisfy the manpower requirements for joint organizations and were inconsistent in validation procedures and manpower requirements determination.
- Support from the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, and Secretaries of the Military Departments in monitoring the careers of officers serving in joint billets was inadequate.
- Joint policy, education, and training of Reserve officers assigned to joint organizations were inadequate.

The report made 17 recommendations. Management concurred, or partially concurred, with 16 of those recommendations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness proposed an alternative that satisfied the intent of the other recommendation.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, "Consolidation of War and Staff Colleges Study," March 1994. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, under the direction of Congress, studied the potential cost savings from consolidation of the Services' command and staff colleges and war colleges, and those colleges' administration. The team conducted this study from a view of possible enhancements to joint education and training that might result from consolidation of these institutions, and a comparison of savings achieved through vertical integration of administrations within each Service. At the outset of this study, the team decided to only review those alternatives with the potential to recover all costs within 5 years of implementation. The team considered four geographical relocation alternatives with recommended consolidations, and concluded that geographic relocation for any of the colleges was not economically viable due to the high cost of new construction. The team also concluded that professional military education was a prudent investment as a force multiplier for the safeguarding of our nation. The team determined that joint colleges provided joint professional competence in an officer's professional development, and recognized that Service colleges provided Service-specific professional education. The team concluded that both joint education and Service-specific education were imperative.

Joint Staff

RAND, National Defense Research Institute, Paper MR-622-JS, "Identifying and Supporting Joint Duty Assignments," 1996. The Joint Staff, Director of Manpower and Personnel, requested RAND conduct an analysis on alternative policy choices for the size and composition of the JDAL and for joint officer management. The RAND researchers assessed both how well the individual Services replenish and rotate officers in and out of joint billets, and how well the organizations owning the billets manage them. The analysis produced eight recommendations. Some of the recommendations included ranking of joint billets on a level of jointness; more objective methodology for identifying critical billets; and allowing junior officers (captains and lieutenants) to receive joint credit. As of December 1997, none of those recommendations had been implemented.

Appendix C. Service Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Processes

Timing of Attendance

JPME Phase II course attendance is coordinated among the Services and the joint organizations to which officers are assigned. The Services select officers for assignment to joint billets and, based on those selections, determine which officers are eligible to attend JPME Phase II. The Services then develop prioritized JPME Phase II attendee lists and coordinate attendance of officers with the joint activities. Officers are then scheduled for a JPME Phase II course and attend TDY en route or TDY and return. In cases where the Services are unable to fill their quotas, they release unfilled seats to the Joint Staff for further coordination and potential use by other Services.

Course Selection Processes

Army. The Army has a screening process in place to review the files of officers eligible to attend JPME Phase II and to be nominated for JSO designation. The Joint Management Branch, Distribution Division, within the Officer Personnel Management Directorate at the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, is responsible for determining which officers will attend JPME Phase II. Officers are selected based on their qualifications and promotion potential, with attendee lists developed based on priorities. The Director, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, approves all nominations for joint positions. The Army attempts to send officers to AFSC TDY en route. When that is not possible, they coordinate with the joint activities, with emphasis on releasing officers to attend JPME II within the first year of the joint assignment. Ultimately, however, the release authority rests with the joint activities, limiting the Army's control. The Army was the only Service that consistently met the Goldwater-Nichols Act requirement to fill at least 50 percent of its joint billets with JSOs or JSO nominees throughout 1997.

Navy. The Navy's Special Assistant for Joint Matters, Distribution Department, Distribution Management, Allocation, Resources and Procedures Division under the Chief of Naval Personnel, is responsible for monitoring joint duty assignments and assigning quotas for JPME Phase II. The course attendance lists are developed based on priorities, with first priority going to those officers who are en route to their joint assignments and second priority to those officers who are in the first year of their joint tours. Priorities are based on guidance contained in CJCS Instruction 1800.01. All school requests are forwarded to the office of the Special Assistant for Joint Matters from Navy assignment officers or joint organizations to which the joint officers are

Appendix C. Service Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Processes

assigned. The Navy had the highest percentage of personnel sent to the AFSC TDY en route, with 43 percent in academic year 1996 and 48 percent in academic year 1997.

Air Force. Two offices within the Air Force handle joint matters: the Joint Officer Management Branch at the Air Force Personnel Center, San Antonio, Texas, and the Air Force Colonel Matters Office (the Colonels' Group) in the Pentagon. The Air Force Personnel Center manages Air Force-controlled joint billets for lieutenant colonels and majors, and determines which of those officers will attend JPME Phase II. The center reviews and ranks the nominations according to priorities, based on Joint Staff and statutory criteria. Priority is given to officers who attend the AFSC TDY en route. The remaining seats are filled through nominations from joint organizations. The Colonels' Group manages Air Force joint billets for colonels and uses similar criteria for selection.

Marine Corps. The Officer Assignments Branch within the Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, has sole responsibility for determining which officers will attend JPME Phase II. It designates 39 officers per year to attend the AFSC JPME Phase II intermediate course in the year following their completion of an Intermediate Service School. Officer designations are based on filling critical billets on the JDAL and consider officers' qualifications, promotion potential, and military occupational specialties. The Marine Corps' intent is to identify promising officers, before they attend an Intermediate Service School, for the purpose of growing and maintaining a pool of officers suitably qualified to be assigned as JSOs to various critical joint duty assignments within the Marine Corps. Officers are then chosen for subsequent attendance at the AFSC and a follow-on joint assignment.

Appendix D. Summary of Potential Benefits

Recommendation Reference	Description of Benefit	Amount or Type of Benefit
A.1.a., A.1.b., and A.2.	Program Results. Greater use of JPME II graduates during a typical 36-month joint assignment.	Nonmonetary.
A.1.c. and A.3.	Program Results and Economy and Efficiency. Reduces last minute student withdrawals and increases annual attendance.	Nonmonetary.
B.1. and B.2.	Program Results and Economy and Efficiency. Increases number of graduates by 200 to 225 annually.	Nonmonetary.
	Program Results and Economy and Efficiency. Reduces per diem ¹ costs (offset by added transportation costs) as a result of shortening JPME Phase II course at the AFSC from 12 to 8 weeks.	Funds put to better use: ranging from \$593,000 to \$680,000 annually, \$3.6 million to \$4.1 million in 6 years (FYDP).
	Program Results and Economy and Efficiency. Reduces per diem costs (offset by added transportation costs) as a result of shortening JPME Phase II course at the AFSC from 12 to 9 weeks.	Funds put to better use: ranging from \$163,000 to \$259,000 annually, \$1.0 to \$1.6 million in 6 years (FYDP).
		The Services' operation and maintenance appropriations would benefit from the funds put to better use: 2020A - Army, 1804N - Navy, 3400F - Air Force, and 1106N - Marine Corps.

¹For calculation of per diem costs, see page 24.

Calculation of Potential Per Diem Funds Put to Better Use²

Per diem costs for current 12-week course:

900 students annually at \$4,531 per student equals \$4.08 million each year.

Per diem costs for suggested 8-week course with 200 additional students in added class:

1,100 students annually at \$3,003 per student equals \$3.30 million each year.

Funds put to better use - \$680,000 annually.

Per diem costs for suggested 8-week course with 225 additional students in added class:

1,125 students annually at \$3,003 per student equals \$3.37 million each year.

Funds put to better use - \$593,000 annually.

Per diem costs for suggested 9-week course with 200 additional students in added class:

1,100 students annually at \$3,385 per student equals \$3.72 million each year.

Funds put to better use - \$259,000 annually.

Per diem costs for suggested 9-week course with 225 additional students in added class:

1,125 students annually at \$3,385 per student equals \$3.8 million each year.

Funds put to better use - \$163,000 annually.

²Funds put to better use have been offset by \$475 transportation costs for each additional student.

Appendix E. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
 Deputy Chief Financial Officer
 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy)
 Deputy Assistant Secretary (Military Personnel Policy)
 Director, Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff
 Deputy Inspector General
 Director for Manpower and Personnel
 Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability

Department of the Army

Chief of Staff of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
 Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command
 Director, Officer Personnel Management Directorate
Auditor General, Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Chief of Naval Personnel
 Special Assistant for Joint Matters
Auditor General, Department of the Navy

Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Management
Inspector General, Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps

Department of the Air Force

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment)
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
Chief of Staff, Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
Commander, Air Force Personnel Center
Chief, Assignment and Joint Policy, Air Force Colonel Matters Office
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force

Unified Commands

Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command

Other Defense Organizations

National Defense University
Armed Forces Staff College
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
National War College
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Inspector General, National Security Agency
Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency

Non-Defense Federal Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget
Technical Information Center, National Security and International Affairs Division,
General Accounting Office

Chairman and ranking minority member of each of the following congressional committees and subcommittees:

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology,
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Committee on National Security

Part III - Management Comments

Department of the Navy Comments

Final Report
Reference



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

AM 29 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AUDITING

SUBJECT: DODIG Draft Report: Evaluation Report on Joint
Professional Military Education Phase II, Project
Number 7RB-9038 - ACTION MEMORANDUM

I am responding to your memorandum, Attachment 1, concerning the evaluation to determine whether the JPME Phase II program is meeting the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The Navy and Marine Corps responses to the draft audit report are provided (Attachments 2 & 3). We have carefully reviewed and concur with the draft report's findings and recommendations. The Navy and Marine Corps are working closely with OSD and JCS representatives to ensure the process for assigning Naval officers to JPME Phase II maximizes use of limited quotas.

We have reviewed all directives and policies pertaining to the assignment officers through Armed Forces Staff College to ensure that Navy and Marine Corps officers are assigned to joint billets, fulfilling Goldwater-Nichols requirements. Assignment policies are in force which have made a positive and lasting impact toward meeting these requirements.

Karen S. Heath

Karen S. Heath
Principal Deputy

Attachments:

1. DODIG memo of 27 February 1998
2. Navy comments on Draft Report
3. Marine Corps comments on Draft Report

Deleted

Navy Comments
on
DODIG Draft Report of 27 February 1998
on
Evaluation Report on Joint Professional Military Education Phase II
Project Number 7RB-9038

Summary of DODIG findings and recommendations

- DODIG found that in November 1997, there was a shortfall of 189 JPME Phase II graduates in joint billets. The shortage of officers trained in joint matters limited the level of expertise required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Finding A).

- The Armed Forces Staff College JPME Phase II 12-week course was too long and could be shortened without sacrificing the quality of the education. The length of the course is mandated by Title 10, United States Code, Section 663 (10 U.S.C. 663). Reducing the length of the course and adding another course during each year at the Armed Forces Staff College could result in an increased throughput of approximately 200 or more students annually (Finding B).

DODIG recommended the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps Service personnel managers maximize the practice of sending officers to the Armed Forces Staff College en route to a joint billet; schedule officers who attend the Armed Forces Staff College after reporting to their joint billets as early as possible in their joint tour; and aggressively use alternate student lists for JPME Phase II to take advantage of any seats vacated at the Armed Forces Staff College. The DODIG recommended that the Navy send more officers to joint assignments after they attend the Armed Forces Staff College. They also recommended that the Director, Joint Staff, designate a single point of contact to coordinate last minute JPME Phase II course substitutions for the Armed Forces Staff College. They recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, examine the JPME Phase II course and determine how much it can be shortened while still maintaining the quality of joint education and achieving the desired benefits of multi-service acculturation. Further, they recommended that the Director, Joint Staff, confirm combatant commanders' support for a shortened JPME Phase II course at the next commanders' conference and determine what change to 10 U.S.C. 663 is deemed necessary.

Navy Statement

The following comments address findings and recommendations pertinent to Navy.

Finding A: Shortage of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Graduates.
DODIG found that in November 1997, there was a shortfall of 189 JPME Phase II graduates in joint billets. Factors contributing to this shortfall were the timing of

attendance, the assignment of Navy graduates to other than joint billets after course completion, the empty seats caused by late withdrawals, and the throughput at the Armed Forces Staff College due to its limited capacity. This shortage limited the level of joint expertise required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Four factors specifically contributed to this shortfall:

- Timing of attendance - in order to comply with CJCS instructions, officers being sent to joint billets should attend JPME Phase II as early as possible;
- Navy assignment practice to joint billets - assigning AFSC graduates to non-joint billets contributed to the shortage of JPME Phase II graduates filling JDAL billets;
- Late withdrawals - late withdrawals of officers from the JPME Phase II attendance list at the AFSC resulted in unfilled course seats;
- Limited capacity - the limited capacity of the AFSC was a significant factor in the shortage of JPME Phase II graduates.

Navy Response: Concur, with comments. See actions taken in response to recommendations A1a, A1b, A1c and A2. Defer action on A3 to Director, Joint Staff.

Recommendation A.1.a: That the Chief of Naval Personnel; the Commander Air Force Personnel Center; and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps, establish the necessary controls and procedures to maximize the practice of sending officers to the Armed Forces Staff College en route to a joint billet.

Navy Response: Concur. Navy will review and revise, as appropriate, all policies and directives pertaining to follow-on joint duty assignment practices to emphasize maximum use of Armed Forces Staff College quotas for those officers on permanent orders to a joint duty assignment billet. A February 1997 policy has already been established which prioritizes AFSC seating for the expressed purpose of capturing officers on orders en route to joint activities. Anticipate completion of review by 30 September 1998.

Recommendation A.1.b: That the Chief of Naval Personnel; the Commander Air Force Personnel Center; and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps, establish the necessary controls and procedures to schedule officers who attend the Armed Forces Staff College after reporting to their joint assignments as early as possible within the first year of those joint assignments.

Navy Response: Concur. As indicated in response to A.1.a., the Navy has already established an assignment policy to give high priority to those officers en route to or

within their first year onboard joint activities. Navy will further establish procedures by 30 September 1998 to systematically contact joint activities to notify them of officers lacking JPME Phase II, in order to aggressively pursue officers assigned within their first year. This will be an ongoing coordination between Navy and the joint activities.

Recommendation A.1.c.: That the Chief of Naval Personnel; the Commander Air Force Personnel Center; and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps, establish the necessary controls and procedures to aggressively use standby lists of alternate students to fill any seats vacated.

Navy Response: Concur. Navy will include these recommendations into the establishment of procedures outlined in response to A.1.b. Expected completion is 30 September 1998.

Recommendation A.2.: DODIG recommend the Chief of Naval Personnel take steps needed to ensure that more officers are assigned to joint billets following attendance at the Armed Forces Staff College.

Navy Response: Concur. Navy will additionally review assignment policy and prioritization to ensure every effort is made to detail Armed Forces Staff College graduates to joint activities to the maximum extent possible. Additionally, the recent AFSC proposed changes to class size and composition will assist the Navy in optimal utilization of our limited quotas. This review will be completed no later than 30 September 1998 pending approval of the FY99 Armed Forces Staff College class schedule.

Finding B: Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Course Length. DODIG found that the AFSC JPME Phase II 12-week course was too long and could be shortened without sacrificing the quality of the education. A reduction in course length and an added class would increase AFSC JPME Phase II graduates by approximately 200 to 225 students annually.

Navy Response: Concur. Defer specific response to Director, Joint Staff.

Recommendation B.1.: That the Director, Joint Staff, examine the curriculum and determine how much the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II course can be shortened without diminishing the quality of joint education or diminishing the desired benefits of multi-Service acculturation.

Navy Response: Defer action to Director, Joint Staff.

Recommendation B.2.a.: That the Director, Joint Staff, at the next combatant commanders' conference confirm that a reduction in JPME Phase II course length is supported by the combatant commanders and is in the best interests of the joint community.

Department of the Navy Comments

Navy Response: Defer action to Director, Joint Staff.

Recommendation B.2.b: That the Director, Joint Staff, at the next combatant commanders' conference determine what change to Title 10, United States Code, Section 663, is deemed necessary.

Navy Response: Defer action to Director, Joint Staff.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

1560
MMA-3
17 Feb 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Subj: EVALUATION REPORT ON JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
PHASE II (PROJECT NO. 7RB-9038)

Ref: (a) DOD-IG Draft Evaluation Report (Project No. 7RB-9038)
dtd 27 Feb 98

1. The following comments are submitted in response to the applicable "Recommendations for Corrective Action" listed in the reference.

a. "Maximize the practice of sending officers to the Armed Forces Staff College en route to a joint billet."

Concur--With few exceptions, we execute our assignments to joint duty during the summer months. Consequently, all of our officers who attend AFSC in an enroute status attend the class that begins in June of each year. The Marine Corps has a quota for 15 officers in the June class. We fill as many of these quotas as possible with officers who are enroute to their next duty station (a joint assignment) immediately following graduation from Intermediate Service School (ISS). Unfortunately, we are often limited in this, as noted in the reference, by parent organizations whose requirements don't always coincide with our own, and who are, more importantly, unwilling to accept a three month gap in a position without the benefit of a turn-over. We concur that we should maximize the practice of sending officers to AFSC enroute and will continue to do so within the constraints that arise from the particular requirements of the various joint, parent organizations.

b. "Schedule officers who attend the Armed Forces Staff College after reporting to their joint assignments as early as possible within the first year of those joint assignments."

Concur--Although it has been our intent to send 100% of our designated officers to JPME Phase II during the first year following graduation from ISS, we have not always been able to do so. Our principal hindrance has arisen from joint organizations who have not agreed to release officers to go to school during the desired time-period. Because of needs of the organization, many times these officers are not made available to attend AFSC until the second year of their tour, or later. We will continue to make every effort to schedule officers to AFSC during the first year of assignment to joint duty again, within the very real constraints imposed by the parent organizations.

Department of the Navy Comments

Subj: EVALUATION REPORT ON JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
PHASE II (PROJECT NO. 7RB-9038)

c. "Aggressively use standby lists of alternate students to fill any seats vacated."

Concur--We have in the past, and will continue in the future, to aggressively use our stand-by list to ensure we fill as many of our quotas--and more, if possible--at AFSC. We currently have allocations for 39 officers to attend the intermediate course and 6 to attend the senior course (total 45) annually. Attendance in the past three academic years was as follows: AY95 - 48, AY96 - 46, AY97 - 48. During the first three sessions of AY98, we have enrolled a total of 35 students. Assigned quotas to date total 34. Although, on occasion, we have been unable to fill seats in a particular class, our aggressive use of our stand-by list has enabled us to go after unfilled quotas from the other Services during other classes. The net effect has been that in each of the last three academic years we have surpassed our total allocation of officers attending AFSC. We are on track to do so again this year.

2. Point of contact for this matter is Major C. E. Smith, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Officer Assignments Branch, DSN 224-5211/2740, commercial (703) 614-5211/2740.


C. A. MUTTER
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs

Department of the Air Force Comments

Final Report
Reference



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



2 APR 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FROM: HQ USAF/DP
1040 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1040

SUBJECT: DoD IG Draft Report, Joint Professional Military Education Phase II, 27 Feb 98,
Project No. 7RB-9038

This is in reply to your memorandum requesting the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Financial Management and Comptroller) to provide Air Force comments on subject report.

The following comments are provided in regards to the draft reports recommendations:

a. Recommendation A.1.a. - Maximize the practice of sending officers to the Armed Forces Staff College en route to a joint billet: Concur with the intent; however, the Air Force is maximizing the practice of sending officers en route TDY to AFSC. As the DoD report indicated the "Air Force gives priority to officers who attend the AFSC TDY en route." We continue to improve our overall percentage of officers attending en route and have improved by three percent points over the last three years. We will continue to send officers en route when class dates correspond to their assignment reporting dates. However, overall en route percentages are determined by assignment reporting dates and scheduled classes for which the Air Force has very little control over.

b. Recommendation A.1.b. - Schedule officers who attend the Armed Forces Staff College after reporting to their joint assignments as early as possible within the first year of those joint assignments: Concur with intent; however, the Air Force is sending 81 percent of their officers to AFSC within their first year of their joint assignment. The Air Force Personnel Center continues to make this the second priority after those who attend enroute.

c. Recommendation A.1.c. - Aggressively use standby lists of alternate students to fill any seats vacated. Concur with the intent; however, the Air Force already complies with this recommendation. The Air Force has aggressively used, and will continue to aggressively use, its standby lists as referenced in the DoD draft report, "Three of the four Services did not meet their

Deleted

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2

quotas for filling seats...The Air Force made the most aggressive and effective use of its standby list, as evidenced by the Air Force filling 100 percent of its quota for academic year 1997 and filling vacant seats of other Services."



ROGER M. BLANCHARD
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff,
Personnel

cc:
SAF/FMPF
SAF/MIM

Joint Staff Comments



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

DJSM 553-98
18 May 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Subject: Evaluation Report on Joint Professional Military Education Phase II
(Project No. 7RB-9038)

1. As requested,¹ the Joint Staff has reviewed the draft DOD IG report on JPME Phase II, following the IG team's visit to the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC). The Joint Staff comments are enclosed.
2. Also enclosed are management comments on the draft report forwarded by the President, National Defense University, and the Commandant, Armed Forces Staff College.
3. The Joint Staff point of contact is Lieutenant Colonel Chine, USAF, J-7, 697-1264.

Approved & Sent with Approval
by: DENNIS C. BLAIR, 18 May 1998, 20:09

DENNIS C. BLAIR
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures

Reference:

- 1 OIG DOD memorandum, 27 February 1998, "Evaluation Report on Joint Professional Military Education Phase II (Project No. 7RB-9038)"

Joint Staff Comments

Final Report Reference

ENCLOSURE

JOINT STAFF COMMENTS ON JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PHASE II

1. The following are Joint Staff comments on three recommendations cited in the Executive Summary, page ii, Summary of Recommendations paragraph.

Recommendation
A.3

a. Recommendation #1. The Director, Joint Staff, designate a single point of contact to coordinate last minute JPME Phase II course substitutions for the Armed Forces Staff College.

The action recommended on page ii of the executive summary and page 9A.3 of the report has been taken and should be removed from the final report. In the CJCSI 1800.01, February 1998, revision, "Chairman's Officer Professional Military Education Policy," (OPMEP), page C-5d, Student Quota Reallocation, J-7 Military Education Division is the single point of contact for all quota allocations.

Recommendation
B.1.

b. Recommendation #2. The Director, Joint Staff, examine the JPME Phase II course and determine how much it can be shortened while still maintaining the quality of joint education and achieving the desired benefits of multi-Service acculturation.

(1) Concur. The Chairman's Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) Team, as mandated in CJCSI 1800.01, is the process for quality assessment of our joint programs. The PAJE accreditation visit to AFSC was conducted in January 1998. The team of 15 educators included members from the Service's intermediate and senior level colleges, a DOD educational representative, and an independent technical advisor. They reviewed AFSC's strategic plans, curriculum, faculty and faculty development, and most important the quality of meeting the OPMEP learning objectives. The final report cited that AFSC was doing an excellent job of meeting all learning objectives. The Chairman officially accredited AFSC on 20 March 1998, which reaffirmed AFSC's program for a 5-year period.

(2) A Joint Staff led review is under way for all JPME objectives, course length, faculty and instructive modes, in coordination with OSD and Service representatives.

c. **Recommendation #3.** The Director, Joint Staff, confirm combatant commanders' support for a shortened JPME Phase II course at the next commanders' conference and determine what change to 10 USC 663 is deemed necessary.

Recommendation
B.2.

Concur. The Joint Staff is currently reviewing Chapter 38 of Title 10, USC, which includes a section on the future of JPME Phase II. The working group recommendations will be coordinated with the combatant commanders.

2. Delete Page i, Executive Summary, Evaluation Results, third paragraph, last sentence; and page 5, Finding A, first paragraph, the last sentence: "The shortage of trained officers in joint matters limited the level of expertise required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Finding A)." Do not agree that the level of expertise is limited. The current figures from the JDAMIS Management Report, 20 April 98, indicate JDAL positions are filled with 53 percent JSO's and JSO nominees. We have 270 more JSO officers serving in JDAL positions throughout DOD than required by the Goldwater Nichols Act.

Revised

Draft DOD IG

1. Page i, Evaluation Results referenced page 5.

Finding A. Shortage of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Graduates. "In November 1997, there was a shortfall of 189 JPME Phase II graduates in joint billets. Factors contributing to this shortfall were the timing of attendance, the assignment of Navy graduates to other than joint billets, the empty seats caused by late withdrawals, and the throughput at the Armed Forces Staff College due to its limited capacity. The shortage of JPME Phase II-trained officers limited the level of joint expertise required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act."

Comment: The shortfall has nothing to do with AFSC capacity, but rather the timing of attendance and assignment of graduates to other than a joint billet. AFSC's annual output of 900 officers easily meets the requirement if Services ensure graduates attend at the proper time and go to a joint assignment after graduation.

2. Page i, Para. 2

Evaluation Results: "The AFSC JPME Phase II 12-week course was too long and could be shortened without sacrificing the quality of the education."

Comment: The visiting DOD IG members did not review or analyze the content of the curriculum. Without this scrutiny, any "length of the course" and "quality of education" discussion goes beyond the realm of the study. Note: In Appendix A, Evaluation Process, Scope and Methodology, the sentence "We did not review or analyze the content of the JPME Phase II curriculum." should follow the sentence outlined above.

3. Page 2

Professional Military Education Panel. "... In 1991, the intermediate course was expanded to 12 weeks. In 1994, the AFSC also expanded the senior course to 12 weeks."

Comments: As written, these sentences imply that AFSC made the decision to increase the course length. Recommend replace with the following: "... In 1991, as directed by the Joint Staff*, AFSC expanded the intermediate course to 12 weeks. In 1994, as required by public law**, the AFSC also expanded the senior course to 12 weeks.

* DJSN-684-91 dtd 5 June 1991

** Section 663 of title 10 U S code required that not later than 1 January 1994, the duration of the principal course of instruction at the Armed Forces Staff College be not less than three months in duration.

Revised

4. Page 5.

Requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. "....The Goldwater-Nichols Act requirement that 50 percent of the JDAL billets must be filled by JSOs or JSO nominees was not being met."

Comment: Recommended for clarity "....Goldwater-Nichols Act requires each Service to ensure that approximately 50 percent of JDAL billets are filled with JSOs, JSO nominees, or Critical Occupational Specialty (COS). Title 10, Sec 661 provides a break down of each category (37.5 percent -JSOs/JSO noms and 12.5 percent -COS) NDU/AFSC annual quotas are based on 37.5 percent of the JDAL.

5. Page 6:

Timing of Attendance First para, line 5 states "....However, limited capacity at the AFSC precluded most officers assigned to joint billets from going to the JME Phase II course TDY en route. Officers who attend the AFSC TDY en route subsequently count as JPMES Phase II graduates for the entire 36-month joint tour. In academic year 1996, 264 officers (30 percent) who completed JME Phase II at the AFSC were TDY en route in academic year 1997, 280 (33 percent) were TDY en route."

Comment: Although AFSC can only absorb 300 students per class, the problem with TDY enroute statistics has nothing to do with AFSC capacity but rather services assignment policies. The June class, which should be filled by the Services entirely with TDY en route officers to capitalize on ISS graduations, was filled at a 62 percent TDY en route rate. The September, January, and March classes have been filled at a 14 percent rate. The problem lies in service assignment priorities not AFSC capacity. AFSC's capacity will easily support a 60-70 percent annual TDY en route rate vice the current 33 percent annual rate, but the Services must send the officers TDY en route to achieve this rate.

Timing of Attendance First para line 4 states "....that, optimally, officers should complete their joint education prior to or within the first year of their joint assignments...."

Second para, line 7 states "Services and joint activities are required to schedule and release joint officers for course attendance as early in their joint tours as possible within the first year...."

Comments: The first paragraph states that it is optimal if officers attend during their first year whereas the second paragraph mentioned stated that it is a requirement. These two paragraphs are inconsistent.

6. Page 7.

Finding A. Shortage of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II Graduates:

"...Although CJCS Instruction 1800.01 authorizes the president of the National Defense

Revised

University to reallocate unfilled university spaces, that level of control is not practical, and organizations involved in the scheduling process stated it was not clear which office adjudicates the question of moving unfilled billets from one Service to another. "

Comments: All Services are authorized to turn their unfilled quotas in to the J-7 for distribution to the other Services if necessary. The student seat formula was provided by the College Resource Manager. In the past the Services have utilized this procedure when turning in quotas and requesting additional quotas. All of these requests were worked personally by LCDR Mohr formally of the J-7.

7. Page 7:

Limited Capacity: "The capacity of the AFSC was a significant factor in the shortage of JPME Phase II graduates. Less than half of all officers assigned to joint billets had attended JPME Phase II ..."

Comments: Service assignment policies, not AFSC capacity are the cause of JPME graduate shortages. AFSC was designed by Congress to produce Phase II educated officers (JSO nominees). Goldwater-Nichols Act requires each Service to ensure that approximately 50 percent of JDAL billets are filled with JSOs, JSO nominees, or Critical Occupational Specialty (COS). Title 10, Sec 661 provides a break down of each category (37.5 percent -JSOs/JSO noms and 12.5 percent -COS). NDU/AFSC annual quotas are based on 37.5 percent of the JDAL.

8. Page 11:

The Pilot Program: "A goal of this program is to maximize the number of officers who go TDY to the course en route to their joint assignment."

Comment: Although one goal was specifically identified, the program was established for a number of reasons. (1) improve TDY en route (2) improve quality of life issues (3) improve logistical support and (4) improve administrative preparation. It should be noted the Pilot Program officially started with the Jun 97 class although coordination had been working for several months prior to the official start date.

- The TDY en route percentage for the June 1997 class was 62% en route and the overall percentage for the entire academic year was 33%.
- Improved quality of life issues: Prior to the program, there was a substantial number of students who were notified of their class assignment at the last minute causing a lack of preparation prior to coming to the course and difficulties making family arrangements for their family members. Since the implementation of the program, late student notifications have decreased from 38% (97-21/25) to 12% (9811/15).
- Improved logistical support/coordination: Prior to the Pilot Program there was a number of officers in each class who reported to AFSC expecting to attend class

without the proper Service authorization and expecting to be placed in a class seat. In the past the students were accepted at AFSC because the documentation was poorly kept or nonexistent which made it difficult in enforcing the policy not to admit the student. However, the Pilot Program clearly documents the coordination and it also properly identifies the students to attend AFSC in addition to keeping all concerned parties i.e. Commands, the Services, and AFSC informed of any last minute changes and why the changes occurred. Since the implementation a zero percent walk-in rate for 97-41 /35 & 98-11/15 has been achieved. Students and their commands are notified earlier of their projected attendance. Since messages are coordinated with the Commands 120 days prior to the start of class, this allows the command to better plan for their officer's absences when they are attending school.

- **Improved Administrative Preparation:** Since the implementation of the Pilot Program the administrative preparation for the students has been streamlined and improved. The student's seminar assignments, nametags, desk strips, and school rosters are prepared in advance as opposed to the last minute. The students assignment to the temporary Student Officer Quarters are coordinated and finalized sooner. In the past these activities were occurring in some cases the Friday prior to the start of class. With the implementation of the Pilot Program these activities are completed on the average 2 weeks prior to the start of class.

Lastly, the Pilot Program can only improve if all parties are taking an active role. If a student is assigned to a command, the Service has no control as to whether or not the student will actually report for class because it is up to the command to actually release the student to attend AFSC.

9 Page 9 A 3 "We recommend the Director, Joint Staff, in order to reduce late withdrawals and prevent empty seats at the Joint Professional Military Education Phase II courses at the Armed Forces Staff College, designate a single point of contact to coordinate last minute substitutions."

Comment: The Services already work through one single POC at J-7 when dealing with the student quotas. The Services work very hard in filling all of the quotas as represented by the current class data. Class 98-21 had a quota of 137 and the actual fill was 141 and Class 98-25 had a quota of 32 and the actual was 33. The Services are utilizing their stand-by rosters, but the bottom line is, if the commands do not release the student then the seat will go unfilled.

10 Page 10:

Finding B... "The AFSC JPME Phase II 12-week course was too long and could be shortened without sacrificing the quality of the education....."

Comments: This assertion was not supported by any analysis or factual data in your report. The curriculum was not discussed during your visit and therefore could not have been adequately analyzed to make this assertion.

Page 10

Page 11

Revised

Page 11


Revised

11. Page 10.

Course Length Could Be Shortened: ".....No longer do students arrive at the AFSC with limited knowledge of joint operations as they did in the past. An unquantifiable number of students have been exposed to jointness through participation in joint operations ranging from Operation Desert Storm to Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia...."

Comment: These statements are unfounded. Incoming students are tested via a pretest, which measures application of these issues. Trended data (from as far back as 1994 to the present) indicate the average pretest score is 45 percent, suggesting students coming from JPME I have NOT mastered a broad knowledge of joint issues. The question of Phase I student competencies has been discussed by faculty and leaders in both the Phase I and II schools, and it is apparent that additional testing instruments should be developed to measure constructs such as outgoing Phase I knowledge or incoming Phase II knowledge.

Additionally on the end-of-class survey students are asked about the amount of review of Phase I material they received in Phase II (See Graph 1). Consistently students said they either were satisfied with the amount of review material (opinions ranged from 60 to 73 percent) OR would like to see it increased (opinions ranged from 11 to 24 percent). The percentage of students who would like to see review decreased is usually higher with students attending June to September, who often come to AFSC directly from Phase I schools. Data generated from students themselves indicate that over 80 percent of AFSC graduates think the amount of review is about right or would like to see it increased.



Page 11

12. Page 10.

Combatant Command Responses: "Personnel at all nine combatant commands reported the JPME Phase II program at the AFSC was too long. While the combatant commands did not want to sacrifice the quality of joint education provided at the AFSC, all nine

commands indicated the current 12-week JPME Phase II courses could be shortened to eight or nine weeks, while still maintaining the same quality of joint education."


Comments: Impossible to determine without analyzing AFSC's educational requirements and the curriculum. Again, this statement appears beyond to scope of the study and not supported by analysis

13. Page 15.

Graduate Responses: "When AFSC graduates, serving in joint billets, and supervisors of graduates at the Combatant Commands and the Joint Staff were interviewed, 74 percent indicated JPME Phase II at the AFSC was too long, and the course objectives could be attained in a shorter period of time." "The AFSC will now include a question about course length in their surveys to all graduates and their supervisors."

Comment: At the suggestion of visiting members of the DOD ICI team, the Assessment Division staff drafted a new question that was added to the end-of-class survey distributed to students when they have completed the Phase II program. The question asked the students what they thought the length of the Phase II program should be. Sixty-six percent (75 students) of the Class 98-I students stated the length should be left as is, 12 weeks. (See Graph 2) Comments from students included, "I agree the length of the program is satisfactory, HOWEVER, for most of the courses there is WAY TOO MUCH contact time," "Keep it as is. There should be another focus study, they really drive the point home," "Keep program length as is, reduce deliberate planning and increase multinational/coalition forces training," and "The length is ok. There is plenty of time in the course. Need to make better use of available time." In fact, several students agreed that course length should be increased to 13 or 15 weeks, giving such reasons as, "Must include more discussion of multinational and peace support operations. Coalition warfare is a fact of life," "More emphasis on service capabilities and assets!" and "I think the final exercise could be lengthened to allow the development of the process and products."

Graph 2
The overall length of the JCSOS class should be:




Similar to the end-of-class survey results where students felt the course length was about right, the Graduate and Supervisor Survey (administered six months following graduation) data indicate that JCSOS's curriculum is useful to both the graduates and

their supervisors (Graph 3). Keeping in mind that AFSC's graduates are assigned to over nine different functional areas, i.e. J-1, J-2, ... J-9, these are very high results. A review of written comments from the last several years was conducted and the following general statements can be made:

1. Even when all course work is not utilized in a particular job, the graduate finds value from the joint process utilized at AFSC.
2. Students often will comment that this was a good course while rarely stating it was a bad course.
3. Only one student stated that the course was too long.

Graph 3
"How Useful Is The JCSOS Curriculum?"



Page 12

14. Page 11.

Reducing Course Length and Increasing Throughput: "A reduction in the course length from the current 12 weeks to 8 or 9 weeks would result in an increase in production time. commands would be able to use their joint officers for more of their tours."

Comment: Course length should not be addressed without substantive review and analysis of the curriculum.

Page 12-13

15. Page 12.

Reducing Course Length and Increasing Throughput: "Additionally, a reduction in course length would allow the AFSC to increase the number of JPME II intermediate classes from four to five per year."

Comment: Course length should not be addressed without substantive review and analysis of the curriculum.

Page 13

18. Page 12

Potential Economics and Efficiencies: "The Services would have lower per diem costs, including lodging and meal allowance for each JPME Phase II student. Reducing the course length to 8 weeks would reduce overall per diem costs by \$ 1,529 per person. Even adding another class of 200 to 225 officers to the Annual Forces Staff College schedule, DOD would still realize \$700,000 to \$775,000 in funds put to better use annually in the form of lowered per diem costs. The amount would be somewhat reduced by the additional transportation of \$95,000 to \$107,000 annually (approximately \$475) and would result in funds put to better use in the amount of \$593,000 to \$680,000. Based on the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), that could amount from \$3.6 million to \$4.1 million for DOD over a 6-year period. The overall amount of reduced expenditures would be changed if the courses were reduced to 9 weeks instead of 8 weeks. A reduction in course length to 9 weeks would result in funds put to better use in the amount of \$163,000 to \$259,000 annually considering lowered per diem costs and additional transportation costs. See Appendix D for further details."

Comment: This study did not incorporate any curriculum analyses to determine quality versus quantity issues. Therefore, the premise (shortened without sacrificing the quality of education) for determining the fiscal economies is not valid. Cost saving can be realized at the expense of negatively impacting the quality of education.

U.S. Pacific Command Comments



COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
(USCINCPAC)
CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-4028

J004
5040
IG Ser: 12
22 Apr 98

To: Director, Readiness and Logistics Support Directorate, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-2884

Subj: EVALUATION REPORT ON JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PHASE II (PROJECT NO 7RB-9038)

Ref: (a) DoD IG Draft of Proposed Evaluation Report, 27 Feb 98

1. Concur with the findings and recommendations in ref (a) report.

2. We wish to provide the following comments:

a. Finding A - Shortage of JPME Phase II graduates.

(1) USPACOM has numerous non-JPME II graduates filling joint billets. Many of these officers will depart our command without completing Phase II. Some incoming personnel do not meet requirements of the JSO billet. This command has experienced some problems over the last three years getting qualified JSOs to fill JSO-designated billets. Asking the Services to request a waiver to assign a non-JSO to a JSO-designated billet or moving the JSO designation to another billet is not appropriate; training the right number of officers with the right skills is appropriate.

(2) Recommend the Services select officers to attend Phase II based on the skills required of JSO billets. For example, do not send an Air Force personnel officer to Phase II when there is no requirement for an Air Force personnel officer JSO billet.

(3) Strongly support the recommendation of a single POC to identify last-minute fills for late withdrawals. Many officers in this command are prepared to respond with minimum notification.

b. Finding B - JPME Phase II course length. Strongly agree with shortening the course without diminishing the quality of education. We have made that recommendation three times over the past three years, based on feedback from graduates. While there is concern that this will take congressional action, it is now time to pursue congressional authority in order to fine-tune this important course and conserve valuable resources.

**Subj: EVALUATION REPORT ON JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
PHASE II (PROJECT NO. 7RB-9038)**


c. Additional Point. We recently became aware of an AFSC proposal to change the Phase II course from four classes a year to three. We have expressed our concerns to the Joint Staff J1 and J7. Four other joint commands support our concerns.

(1) The proposed AFSC change will result in canceling the September 1998 class and the loss of 240 seats with no apparent plan to absorb the loss.

(2) Changing the June class to July will force some officers to take leave departing ISS-level school, and they must leave school within five days of graduation, but are not allowed to sign into AFSC until three days prior to classes beginning.

(3) The AFSC proposal is in direct conflict with some of the recommendations made in referenced DoD IG draft report.

3. POCs are COL Shepherd (DIG) and COL Colaw (J11) at DSN 477-5101 or 477-1369, respectively.



JOSEPH E. DEFRANCISCO
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Commander in Chief/
Inspector General

U.S. Central Command Comments



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCIG

27 Mar 98

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD IG, ATTN: CAPT LAWSON

SUBJECT: Evaluation Report on Joint Professional Military Education Phase II (Project No. 7RB-9038)

1. CCIG concurs with the report. There are several points we wish to bring to your attention, but we concur with each of the findings.

2. Finding A. Shortage of JPME Phase II graduates.

a. Concur, there is a shortfall of JPME Phase II graduates as compared with joint billets. However, USCENCOM has not historically experienced problems filling Joint Critical billets with Joint Specialty Officers (JSO).

b. Concur with recommendations for corrective action. Sending officers to the Armed Forces Staff College en route to joint billets and sending officers within their first year of a joint assignment will maximize the officer's contributions to this command.

3. Finding B. JPME II course length.

a. Concur with Finding B, JPME Phase II course length. This command is in favor of reducing the course length to either eight or nine weeks. Reducing the length of the course will increase the time on station and the productivity of the officers concerned. Additionally, adding another class during the year will significantly increase the number of officers that can be trained as JSOs.

b. Concur with the recommendations for corrective action pertaining to Finding B. The course must be reviewed to determine the actual acceptable course length and recommended changes to Title 10 must be made.

4. POC for this action is Col Horne, CCJ1, Director of Manpower and Personnel, 813-828-5863.


Ar Fields
Brigadier General, USMC
Inspector General

Evaluation Team Members

This report was prepared by the Readiness and Logistics Support Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD.

Shelton R. Young
Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Williams, United States Army
Major Robert D. Gibson, United States Air Force
Judith A. Heck
Pamela Steele-Nelson